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The topic of military executions has dominated the study of discipline and 
punishment during the First World War. 
Considering the relatively small numbers of 
men who were executed, 361 in British and 
Dominion forces combined, it is startling how 
much attention the subject has garnered.1 The 
morality of the practice been widely discussed 
and debated and it has spawned recent pardons 
campaigns in the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and Canada. Yet, virtually ignored in these 
debates have been the stories of the 3,080 men 
of the British and Dominion forces who were 
also sentenced to death, but saw their sentences 
commuted. What was the fate of these men and 
what accounts for their salvation when the luck 
of others had run out? 
The main focus of this article is a comparison 
between those death sentences confirmed and 
those commuted. The topic has been solely 
researched within a Canadian context in which 
222 death sentences were passed during the 
course of the war, and 25 Canadians actually 
faced the firing squad. Similar to the British 
statistics as a whole, 89 per cent of all Canadian 
death sentences were commuted in the First 
World War.2 
For the purpose of this article, the courts-martial 
and personnel records of 50 Canadian soldiers 
have been studied. An attempt has been made 
to  find patterns and consistencies to explain 
why some death sentences were confirmed when 
others were not. Preliminary findings suggest 
that the timing of a particular offence, the 
disciplinary state of an accused soldier’s battalion 
and the opinions of divisional commanders 
were the most important influences acting upon 
the final decision of a military court martial. 
However, where an individual soldier’s personal 
disciplinary record was taken into account, the 
decisions of the courts-martial appear, more 
often than not, to have been quite random and 
arbitrary. 
The Courts-Martial Process
To our modern mindset, the practice of a military killing its own volunteers is a 
difficult one to comprehend, yet from 1914 to 
1918, military executions were seen both as an 
effective punishment, and as a necessary tool 
in the maintenance of morale. It is within the 
context of those times which one needs to analyse 
the practice of military executions. In Canada 
in 1914 the death penalty was both accepted by 
and practiced in civilian society, and in the case 
of the military death penalty, examination of 
Parliamentary Debates from 1914 to 1921 gives 
no suggestion that there was any controversy 
over its use. 
In 1914 the death penalty was applicable to a 
number of crimes listed in the Army Act.3 This 
study is concerned solely with its application to 
the crimes of desertion and cowardice. Defined 
by the Manual of Military Law of 1914, desertion 
“implies an intention on the part of the offender 
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either not to return to His Majesty’s service at all, 
or to escape some particular important service…”4 
Therefore, intent is the most important feature 
and distinguishes desertion from the lesser 
charge of absence without leave (AWL). Cowardice 
was a much more subjective charge and therefore 
harder to prove. Cowardice could be linked to 
disobedience or refusal to obey orders, however, 
it differed from these lesser charges in that the 
offence had to occur before the enemy or in the 
presence of danger.5
There were four types of courts martial: 
regimental, district, general and field general. 
Regimental and district courts-martial dealt with 
minor crimes, while general and field general 
were reserved for serious offences which could 
potentially result in a punishment of death. The 
cases researched for this study deal exclusively 
with field general courts-martial (FGCM). FGCMs 
differed from general courts-martial in that 
they were held in the field and in the interest of 
expediency were simplified in both procedure 
and requirements. Throughout the course of the 
First World War FGCMs were far more common 
than general courts-martial.
In order to convene a court martial with full 
punitive authority, no less than three officers 
were required to be in attendance. In the case 
of passing a sentence of death it was required 
that all members of the court martial be in 
agreement. The final decision in any death 
sentence rested upon the Commander-in-Chief. 
On the Western Front, where 90 percent of British 
death sentences were passed, Field Marshal Sir 
John French was Commander-in-Chief from 
August 1914 until the end of 1915; thereafter, 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig assumed the 
appointment. The fact that Haig confirmed the 
bulk the executions (253 death sentences were 
confirmed by Haig) has only fueled the popular 
representation of him as an uncaring and 
ruthless leader, the so-called “Butcher of the 
Somme.” Yet, according to some historians, the 
very fact that 90 percent of the death sentences 
passed were eventually commuted does much to 
dispute this description.6
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of 
the British Commonwealth forces, is often referred to as 
“The Butcher of the Somme.” He was the man responsible 
for confirming the majority of death sentences during the 
First World War. However, the fact that 90 percent of death 
sentences were overturned puts Haig in a different light.
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By 1915 all capital cases required a plea of “not 
guilty” to insure that evidence would be heard. 
Perpetrators were offered the assistance of a 
“prisoner’s friend” who was an officer who usually 
had little knowledge of military law or procedure, 
but was assigned to act in the role of defense 
counsel. The army did not take full advantage of 
trained lawyers who served among the ranks.7 
For those punishments handed down by the 
FGCMs there were some guidelines, but only 
regarding maximum punishments, which were to 
be imposed for the worst offences and to habitual 
offenders. In the cases of commuted sentences, 
alternative punishments were commonly military 
imprisonments, which could be served with or 
without hard labour, and penal servitude. The 
sentences in the cases studied range anywhere 
from two to 15 years and further research has 
turned up no formal guidelines informing these 
sentences. By all accounts the punishments in the 
commuted cases appear to have been somewhat 
random and dependent upon the sentencing 
officer.
 The power of commutation was further 
reinforced in 1915 with the Suspension of 
Sentences Act. According to a 1918 report by 
the Ministry of Overseas Forces in Canada, the 
Act was meant to “give men who had committed 
serious military offences, because of exhaustion, 
or their loss of courage or for other reasons, 
a chance to save their reputation and to win a 
remission of their sentences.”8 More than an act 
of mercy towards soldiers, the Suspension of 
Sentences Act also prevented the overcrowding of 
military prisons and balanced the military’s two 
strongest needs– firm discipline and an ample 
supply of men for the front lines.
The Evidence
Among the 50 cases examined in this study  are all 25 members of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force (CEF) who were executed, 
as well as 25 men who were sentenced to death, 
but later had their sentences reprieved. The 25 
commuted cases were chosen to correspond 
with the confirmed cases. For example, if there 
was an individual sentenced and executed in 
1917, a death sentence which was passed and 
commuted in 1917 was also selected. Wherever 
possible there was also an attempt to match the 
dates by month as well. The cases were also 
chosen by offence. Therefore, for every individual 
executed for desertion, there is an individual 
who had their death sentence commuted for the 
same offence. However, because two of the 25 
men were executed for murder and there was 
no possibility of commutation in such cases, 
two more commuted cases of desertion were 
chosen in their stead. The 50 cases represent 
an array of Canadian battalions and span from 
1916, the year of the first execution, to 1918. One 
soldier executed was a company quartermaster 
sergeant, serving as platoon sergeant at the time 
of his offence; all of the others were privates. All 
incidents studied occurred on the Western Front.9
The information for each individual comes  from 
courts-martial records and military personnel 
files. The documents contained within the courts-
martial records were not uniform. In the cases of 
the executed men transcripts of courts-martial 
do not exist. It is unknown what has become 
of these records and one can only assume that 
the records have been lost or destroyed. In 
addition, because courts-martial were held in 
the field and in a hurried manner, there was 
likely very little documentation to begin with as 
record keeping was not a priority. This lack of 
evidence is perhaps revealing of the nature of 
the courts-martial process. Most useful for the 
present paper were Field Service Records, letters 
from officers to divisional headquarters, and in 
some cases, personal letters from relatives of 
the deceased which were included in the files. 
Among the commuted cases, courts-martial files 
were more complete, containing such crucial 
documents as schedules listing both charges and 
pleas, summaries of evidence including witness 
testimony, and most telling of all, statements of 
superior officers regarding the character of the 
accused, the state of discipline in the battalion 
and recommendations for punishment. Again, 
the files were not standardized, but on the whole 
these records were in much better condition than 
the records of those men executed.
In the case of military personnel files, the 
information was much more uniform. Among 
the most important documents were statements 
of attestation which were helpful in constructing 
personal backgrounds; medical records which 
detailed any injuries and illnesses; and finally, 
reports listing all military offences and their 
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corresponding punishments. The combination 
of all of these documents allowed the assembly 
of a more complete picture of the individuals 
investigated, both from a personal and from a 
disciplinary perspective. 
Factors Affecting Courts-Martial
Disciplinary Records
Popular perception would assume that as in civilian law, an individual soldier’s past 
disciplinary record would be one of the most 
important factors in sentencing, and, therefore, 
one of the most accurate predictors in the 
decision of a military court martial. Based on 
this, one might assume that the records of the 
25 Canadians executed were among some of 
the worst in the CEF, giving the members of the 
courts-martial little reason to exercise mercy, 
while, conversely, first time offenders would be 
spared the ultimate penalty. Many of the cases 
did conform to these general rules. For example, 
Private James Wilson had four AWL charges and 
had been the subject of numerous FGCMs before 
he was eventually shot for desertion. Out of the 
23 men executed for desertion or cowardice, 18 
had previous records that had included charges 
for either desertion or absence without leave, 
or in some cases both. Furthermore, seven of 
these individuals had been previously courts-
martialed, including Privates Charles Welsh, 
Stephen Fowles and Norman Ling, who had all 
been reprieved from earlier death sentences. 
Conforming to what may have been expected 
among the commuted cases of death, 12 of the 
25 men were first time offenders. 
Yet, a significant number of men seemed to 
have been sentenced in contradiction to the 
military’s own standards. Five men with clean 
records were shot by order of a court martial. 
Included in this group is Platoon Sergeant 
William Alexander, who had an exemplerary 
disciplinary and service record prior to his crime 
and execution. While men such as Alexander 
suffered due to the inconsistencies in the court 
martial system, others seem to have benefitted 
Major-General Arthur Currie, commander of 1st Canadian 
Division, believed that the death sentence was warranted 
in some cases, especially for repeat offenders, but his 
sanction did not always result in the execution being 
carried out.
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from them. Private Matthew Latto was a long-
time disciplinary problem for the Canadian 
Corps. Before his desertion conviction and 
death sentence in January 1916, Latto had 
seven previous disciplinary incidences which 
had included ten different charges, including 
four for absence without leave. Recommending 
that Latto’s sentence of death be carried out, 
Major-General A.W. Currie, commander of 1st 
Canadian Division, wrote of Latto’s record on 
21 January 1916:
This man has previously been tried and found 
guilty of a similar offence. He has further been 
guilty on several occasions of absence and also 
of insubordination. He has been sentenced to 
18 months of I.H.L. (commuted to 6 mos.); to 
2 years’ I.H.L. and to 5 years’ Penal Servitude 
without effect.10
Nevertheless, Latto’s sentence was commuted 
to 15 years penal servitude. His case does not 
stand alone. Thirteen of the commuted cases had 
previous charges of AWL or desertion, and of this 
number six can be classified as having very poor 
disciplinary records, meaning that there was a 
previous FGCM conviction for desertion, or more 
than four cases of absence.
 Based upon the cases of repeat offenders such 
as Latto or Auger, a natural question which arises 
for the researcher is why did repeat offenders 
persist in actions which could knowingly result 
in a punishment of death? At an 11 per cent rate 
of confirmation was the death penalty enforced 
enough to be feared? Were soldiers supremely 
confident in the suspension of sentences or did 
they look at possible imprisonment as a means 
of escaping the more dangerous pursuit of front 
line duties? According to historians Cathryn 
Corns and John Hughes-Wilson, for many 
soldiers the decision to desert was based on a 
well-calculated set of risks rather than being the 
result of momentary fits of panic or intense fear 
caused by shell-shock.11 Being fully cognizant 
of the possible penalties, many men felt more 
comfortable in taking their chances on desertion, 
rather than remaining in the front lines. Prison 
was seen as a comfortable alternative to trench 
warfare. A letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel 
T.L. Tremblay, commanding officer of the 22nd 
Battalion, substantiates this claim. In April 1917 
Tremblay wrote:
There seems to be an impression among many 
of the men of my Battalion, that by committing 
the offence of desertion, they will be awarded 
a term of imprisonment, which will prevent 
them from serving in the trenches, and that the 
Canadian Authorities will arrange for sentences 
to be remitted after the war. I am of the opinion 
that in previous cases in which my men have 
been tried by F.G.C.M. and sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment, it has not had a beneficial effect 
on my Battalion.12
However, this reasoning is problematic. While 
it is true that deserters would have likely been 
aware of the low rates of confirmation of death 
sentences, they would have been equally aware of 
the extremely high rates of suspended sentences 
which quickly sent men back into the front lines. 
Out of the 25 commuted cases examined, 22 
prison sentences were suspended and the men 
returned to front line duties. Therefore, if it were 
the ultimate goal of some men to spend their war 
years in prison and far removed from the action, 
their chances of achieving this would have been 
very slim.
Lieutenant-Colonel T.L. Tremblay, commanding officer 
of the 22nd Battalion, believed that the death sentence 
was an essential tool for discipline, otherwise troops 
would desert with the expectation that they would be sent 
to prison and avoid the possibility of being killed on the 
battlefield.
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 The fact is that the Suspension of Sentences 
Act was needed in 1915 as casualties mounted 
and as some deserters and repeat offenders 
took advantage of the system. As a result the 
disciplinary structure was forced to manage 
a precarious balancing act which needed to 
maintain order, yet also consider practical 
manpower needs. The army was not always 
successful in juggling these two goals and at 
times they made mistakes in distinguishing 
between those opportune moments to show 
firmness and those moments to show leniency. 
However, despite protestations on the part of 
some commanders, the problem was not with 
the Suspension of Sentences Act itself. The act 
was a very practical response to the realities of 
the war. The real problem was the inconsistent 
application of punishment. The fact that some 
chronic deserters were consistently treated 
leniently while some first time offenders were 
executed left the system open to criticisms both 
among contemporaries and historians.
State of the Battalion and
Recommendations from Officers
While desertion and cowardice may have been individual acts, they were viewed by the 
military hierarchy as indicative of poor battalion 
discipline. For this reason the state of the 
collective behaviour of a battalion was a major 
factor when deciding whether a sentence of death 
should be confirmed or commuted. Behind every 
decision to execute lay the maxim “for the sake 
of example” and the question of whether such 
an example needed to be made. While it is true 
that some divisional commanders pushed for 
the application of the death penalty more so than 
Table 1a – Personal Information – Executed Cases
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others, it appears that all levels of command 
believed in the deterrent effect of executions.
This intention to reassert discipline in the battalion 
repeatedly emerges as one of the most telling 
and persuasive points made by commanding 
officers charged with reviewing the sentences 
of death. For example, in the case of Alexandre 
Gaudy of the infamously poorly- disciplined 22nd 
Battalion, Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen, 
commander of  6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
wrote that “The crime of desertion from the 
trenches has been very prevalent in this Battalion, 
and it is considered that unless examples are 
immediately made in such cases, that this crime 
will continue.”13 Conversely, when it was felt that 
a battalion was well-disciplined and that a crime 
was not motivated by the overall laxness of the 
battalion, these sentiments were also expressed 
by commanding officers. Such was the case 
in the recommendations found in the court 
martial of Private Townsend of the 1st Canadian 
Mounted Rifles. As Major-General Louis Lipsett, 
commander of the 3rd Canadian Division, 
wrote in Townsend’s recommendation for 
commutation, “The Discipline in the Brigade is 
good, and the Battalion behaved very well during 
the Somme Battle; an example is not required.”14 
It was statements from men such as Ketchen 
and Lipsett which had the most influence on the 
decisions of the confirming authorities. These 
recommendations were absolutely necessary to 
outline the facts of the case, and most importantly 
the quality of the individual and the battalion. 
Recommendations for sentencing were submitted 
up the chain of command. Letters found in those 
cases researched came from commanders of the 
battalions, the brigades and the divisions. Along 
with their recommendations on confirmation of 
the sentence, commanding officers were expected 
to comment on the accused’s behaviour and 
fighting record, whether the crime in question 
Table 1b – Personal Information – Commuted Cases
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was committed deliberately, the state of the 
battalion and whether an example was needed. 
The importance of the recommendations of 
commanding officers speaks to a certain degree 
of maneuverability within the prescribed British 
procedures for courts-martial. Historian Gerard 
Oram believes that on the whole there was more 
leverage within the British military legal system 
than has traditionally understood. He argues that 
unit commanders had the means at their disposal 
to avoid the use of the death penalty among their 
own men.15 In many instances commanders 
looked for extenuating circumstances so as to 
avoid a recommendation of death. For example, 
in the case of Private George Raymond Reed, what 
was described by Brigadier-General J.H. Elmsley 
as “extreme youth” was taken as an extenuating 
circumstance and as a reason to commute 
his death sentence.16 Furthermore, medical 
evidence, in particular shell-shock, also became 
a consideration in courts-marital. By 1916, the 
term shell-shock had become widely known and 
used among the men of the CEF. Not only did 
claims of shell-shock become more abundant 
in the medical tents, but by 1916 shell-shock 
also became a much more widely used defence 
at courts-martial. Some cases surely warranted 
such claims, but many others did not. The reality 
was that most of the men were criminals in the 
context of CEF discipline, and only a few could 
be legitimately categorized as shell-shock victims.
According to The King’s Regulations and Orders 
for the Army, an accused person was supposed 
to be assessed by a medical officer on each day of 
his court martial.17 However, this protocol does 
not appear to have been followed. All evidence 
indicates that medical reviews were only carried 
out when shell-shock was used as a defence or 
if testimony emerged indicating that shell-shock 
was a contributing factor to an offence. Even in 
some cases where these factors were present it 
appears that medical exams were never called 
for. That said, these courts-martial must be 
understood in context. Medical exams were 
time consuming for a system of justice meant 
to deal with crimes quickly and in the field. The 
fact that medical exams were not given for every 
individual who faced a court martial does not 
indicate gross miscarriages of justice. What is 
more problematic is that they were not given 
consistently in cases where shell-shock was a 
probable factor. The inconsistencies may be 
due to the fact that in the First World War shell-
shock was not understood by medical or military 
authorities in the same way that it is today. To 
fault members of courts-martial for this would 
be to project our own knowledge into the past. 
Secondly, the lack of medical exams may have 
been due to the individual wills of officers of the 
court marital wishing to hurry along the process. 
This deliberate disregard for relevant evidence 
is far more problematic and leaves the military 
judicial system open to modern criticism and 
accusations of injustice.
Out of the cases reviewed, three of the executed 
men, Privates Eugene Perry, Thomas Moles and 
Frederick Arnold, made claims of shell-shock. 
It appears that none of these men received a 
medical exam, including Arnold, who had been 
treated for shell-shock just prior to his offence. 
However, incomplete records make it impossible 
to confirm this. Arnold was hospitalized for shell-
shock from 2 January 1916 to 22 May 1916. 
Upon discharge from treatment Arnold absented 
and was apprehended on 27 June 1916. It is 
probable that Arnold’s absence was influenced 
by his illness and his fear of returning to the 
front lines, yet there was no indication among 
his records that Arnold’s illness was taken 
into account. There is no proof of a medical 
examination to determine Arnold’s state of 
mind at the time of his court martial, nor any 
other records which suggest that his illness was 
considered to be an extenuating circumstance. 
Based upon Arnold’s previously clean record and 
his treatment for shell-shock, his case stands out 
as an almost inconceivable decision to proceed 
with execution.
In spite of cases such as Arnold’s, further 
research into commuted cases has proven 
that at times members of courts-marital did 
show genuine concern for a defendant’s mental 
state. At these times, shell-shock was used as 
a successful defence and the medical evidence 
was thoughtfully considered. In the commuted 
cases, records show that seven of the twenty-five 
men had either suffered previous cases of shell-
shock, or had claimed that their offence was in 
some way triggered by their mental condition. 
Out of these seven cases at least three of the men, 
Privates Reuben Smith, Harry Townsend and 
John Owen, did receive evaluations by an Army 
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Medical Board. Without complete documentation 
it is impossible to know the circumstances of the 
other cases. What these commuted cases make 
clear is that there was not a callous disregard for 
all shell-shock claims, nor a systemic attempt 
to target the mentally weak for execution. Not 
every soldier was treated judicially by the court 
marital system, but nor was every individual 
treated unfairly. The reality was much more 
nuanced and dependent upon other mitigating 
factors regarding the accused, the opinion of 
those officers who sat on the court martial, as 
well as overall battalion discipline and timing.
Timing
The third major factor worth considering when discussing the fates of those accused 
of desertion or cowardice was the timing of the 
offence. Both the period and duration of absence 
were factors which weighed heavily upon the 
decisions of the courts-martial. According to the 
findings of Gerard Oram, death sentences were 
strongly influenced by the phases of the war. 
Oram’s statistics indicate a direct correlation 
between an increase in the enforcement of death 
sentences and the planning and execution of a 
major British offensive. Oram believes that there 
are two major reasons for this relationship:
Firstly, desertion increasingly was more prevalent 
as zero-hour approached: tensions were no 
doubt heightened as the usual preliminary 
bombardment intensified. Secondly, the courts 
martial may at such times have adopted a 
harsher line with alleged deserters, using the 
death sentence as a deterrent to prevent any 
evasion of front line duties.18
These standards seem to have been maintained 
throughout the course of major offensives, only 
becoming more relaxed as the battles tapered off.
 Certainly t iming was an important 
consideration when offences and courts-martial 
coincided with major offensives. Offensives 
influenced the behaviour of the ordinary soldier, 
as well as the decisions of high command. For 
example, half of the executions for cowardice in 
the British Army took place during the Battle of 
Somme, a battle which tested the wills of British 
soldiers to a previously unfathomable level.19 
Furthermore, high command was far more 
unlikely to forgive transgressions committed 
during major battles which others endured. No 
Captain holding Court Martial (on nervous German Prisoner) by George L. Stampa.
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Table 2a – Court-Martial Information – Executed Cases
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Table 2a – Court-Martial Information – Commuted Cases
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doubt this was an influential factor in the CEF’s 
decision to execute Private Edward Fairburn. 
Fairburn was absent from April 1917 to January 
1918. The absence of ten months indicated to 
the court martial a very clear intent to desert, 
and an awareness of this intention. Furthermore, 
during his period of absence Fairburn had missed 
the major offensives at Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and 
Passchendaele, an extremely important factor 
in the desperate days of 1917.20 Statistics from 
the 50 cases researched clearly indicate the 
intolerance on the part of command for desertion 
committed in the days preceding or during major 
allied offensives. Out of the 22 men executed 
for desertion in the CEF, three were deserters 
from the Somme, four deserted during or just 
prior to the advance on Vimy, two men were 
deserters from Passchendaele, while three more 
deserted during intense operations. Strikingly, 
only three men whose sentences were commuted 
had deserted during major battles, one from the 
Somme and two from Vimy Ridge. This contrast 
is one of the most telling features that distinguish 
cases in which the death sentence was carried 
out from those in which it was commuted. 
 Larger events in the war also influenced 
decisions on the death penalty. In 1917 the 
French Army, demoralized by the failed Nivelle 
Offensive, fell prey to mutiny. While the French 
managed to recover and fight on, the incident 
heightened the fears of collapse among British 
and Dominion leaders, as they too were losing 
men in extraordinary numbers in offensives 
which often seemed futile. In 1917 there was 
no better instance of these pressures than 
Passchendaele. In attempting to force a British 
breakthrough in Flanders, the British Forces 
launched an attack on 31 July 1917, suffering 
a total of 310,000 casualties over the next three 
months in exchange for five miles of land. Unable 
to admit failure, the British leadership allowed 
the battles to continue far into the autumn. For 
Canada’s part, in two weeks of fighting from 26 
October 1917 to 6 November 1917, the CEF 
suffered 16,000 casualties to capture of the 
village of Passchendaele.21 As Andrew Godefroy 
writes, “The effect on the soldier’s morale can 
only be imagined. Passchendaele was slaughter 
and incompetence of the leadership, and every 
soldier knew it.”22 In an effort to prevent the 
demoralizing effects of the battle, and to ward 
off dissent, the British leadership looked 
to reimpose discipline. Whether executions 
proved at all effective in maintaining morale is 
highly debatable. It is likely that the executions 
were most useful among leaders in convincing 
themselves that they were doing all that could be 
done in order to maintain the fighting capabilities 
under the most disheartening conditions. 
Conclusion
In a 1922 memorandum entitled, “Some Notes Regarding the Award and Confirmation of 
Sentences of Death on Canadian Soldiers in the 
Great War, 1915-1918,” the Chief of the General 
Staff wrote:
It can be confidently asserted that no man 
suffered the extreme penalty except after a 
fair trial and after due consideration had been 
given to all extenuating circumstances. This 
is certainly true of all cases occurring in the 
Canadian Corps and there is no reason whatever 
to doubt that it is not equally true of the cases 
outside the Corps.23
Based on the research contained in this 
article, this statement appears questionable. In 
comparing Canadian death sentences confirmed 
with those that were commuted, certain patterns 
emerge, but so do inconsistencies. While there 
is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that any 
of the convicted men were innocent of their 
crimes, there are a number of cases which 
give one cause to question the decisions of the 
confirming authorities, as well as their attention 
to extenuating circumstances. Most notable 
among these cases are the executions of five first 
time offenders, especially in light of repeated 
commutations of flagrant and habitual offenders. 
A comparison of the confirmed and commuted 
death sentences has shown that, contrary to 
what some historians have led us to believe, the 
military judicial system was not black or white, 
either fair or unfair. It was often apparently 
inconsistent and largely affected by time and 
circumstance.
 The findings presented here suggest that the 
disciplinary record of the convicted man was 
often not so important as the state of the battalion 
and the timing of a crime in relation to major 
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operations. While certainly these factors did not 
hold a consistent level of importance in the 50 
cases examined, they were nevertheless the most 
constant predictors of courts-martial decisions.
 The state of the battalion weighed heavily 
upon the minds of men like Haig and the 
divisional commanders as it spoke to the need 
for examples to be set. “For the sake of example” 
influenced each court martial decision, and 
carried particular weight immediately prior to, 
or during, major offensives. For this reason the 
timing of the accused’s period of desertion or 
act of cowardice was important. To miss a major 
engagement proved not only clear intent to the 
court martial, but at times was considered to be 
an unforgivable transgression.
 What is most striking about the decisions 
of the courts-martial is that often the actual 
facts of a case seemed to have been of 
secondary importance. Recommendations from 
commanders focused on behaviour prior to an 
offence and the state of the battalion, paying 
little attention to the actual details of the crime 
in question. It was not so much the offence that 
was being tried, as it was the individual’s past 
and his battalion’s performance in war.
 In the interest of making an example bad 
choices were sometimes made. Whether a crime 
coincided with a major offensive, or at a time 
when commanders decided it was necessary to 
prove to a rebellious battalion that actions had 
consequences, a soldier often found himself at 
the mercy of circumstances. Therefore, while 
it can be argued that the timing of the offence 
and the state of a battalion proved to be the 
most important factors differentiating between a 
sentence commuted and one confirmed, it should 
also be acknowledged that at times pure luck.
 To characterize the death sentences of the 
First World War as travesty or necessity is not 
enough, and certainly not the topic of this article. 
This article is meant only as another step in 
uncovering the reality of the courts-martial 
system examined through a sample of the cases 
of commuted death sentences. Perhaps the 
greatest injustice which could be done to this 
topic is to not acknowledge the complexity of 
the courts-marital system and to not realize that 
each death sentence represented a unique case 
deserving its own study. It is clear that some 
leaders made mistakes, some men showed fear, 
some men were irresponsible and some injustices 
were committed. To acknowledge this is not to 
call for pardons, but to confront the past in a 
way that promotes deeper understanding. Ninety 
years on, the First World War and the trials of 
its soldiers is a topic which still fascinates many, 
and the executions of our very own is a topic still 
searching for reckoning.
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